This paper investigates a connection between the ordering ⊳ * among theories in model theory and the (N)SOP n hierarchy of Shelah. It introduces two properties which are natural extensions of this hierarchy, called SOP 2 and SOP 1 , and gives a connection between SOP 1 and the maximality in the ⊳ * -ordering. Together with the known results about the connection between the (N)SOP n hierarchy and the existence of universal models in the absence of GCH, the paper provides a step toward the classification of unstable theories without the strict order property. 1
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate a question raised in S.Shelah's paper [Sh 500 ], which asks which first order theories are maximal in the ⊳ * -ordering, and the connection of this question with the NSOP hierarchy introduced in that paper. The exact definitions of these notions are to be given below, but for the moment let us just say that that the purpose of both is to measure relative "complicatedness" of one theory versus another, and our question is how these two measures compare. Our results show that in both of these orders, the theory of a dense linear order, is strictly above the theory of infinitely many independent equivalence relations. The significance of this particular theory is that it is the prototype of a theory which is not simple, but it is just a bit more complicated: it is NSOP 3 . This shows that non-simple theories are not necessarily ⊳ * -maximal. The hierarchy of (N)SOP n for n ≥ 3 was defined by S.Shelah in [Sh 500] , as an attempt to classify the unstable theories without strict order property into countably many classes, "increasing in difficulty" to the theory of a dense linear order. From the definitions in that paper, it is not obvious how one might extend this hierarchy on the lower side of it, to define properties which would take place of SOP 2 and SOP 1 for example. This paper gives a definition of two properties which do exactly that. Together with the results on the existence of universal models, in [Sh 500 ] and elsewhere, this paper gives evidence that the ideas of the (N)SOP n hierarchy might be at least a good approximation to what is needed in the desired classification. This paper extends the (N)SOP n hierarchy by considering further properties close to the lower end of the hierarchy. The order ⊳ * is related to the Keisler ordering of theories, but here we do not concentrate on that connection. Further results in the direction investigated by this paper will be presented in a future paper by S. Shelah and A. Usvyatsov. The paper is organised as follows. In the first section we investigate the theory T * feq considered in S. Shelah's [Sh 457 ]. This is simply the model completion of the theory of infinitely many parametrised equivalence relations. We show that under a partial GCH assumption, this theory is not maximal with respect to ⊳ * λ , as it is strictly below the theory of a dense linear order. The order ⊳ * λ is defined in the first section, and a reference to it was made in the previous paragraph. It was shown in S. Shelah's [Sh 500 ] that the theory of an infinite dense linear order is ⊳ * λ -maximal for any λ ≥ ℵ 0 . The theory T * feq is a typical example of a theory with the tree order property (i.e. not simple), but without the strict order property, and it satisfies NSOP 3 . In the second section of the paper, we extend Shelah's NSOP n hierarchy by introducing two further properties, which we call SOP 1 and SOP 2 , and we show that their names are justified by their position in the hierarchy. Namely SOP 3 =⇒ SOP 2 =⇒ SOP 1 . Furthermore, SOP 1 theories are not simple. We also show that T * feq is NSOP 1 . The last section of the paper contains the main result, which provides a strong connection (unfortunately not a characterisation) of the ⊳ * order with the (N)SOP n hierarchy. The following conventions will be used in the paper.
Convention 0.1 Unless specified otherwise, a "theory" stands for a first order complete theory. An unattributed T stands for a theory. We use τ (T ) to denote the vocabulary of a theory T , and L(T ) to denote the set of formulae of T .
By C = C T we denote aκ-saturated model of T , for a large enough regular cardinalκ and we assume that any models of T which we mention, are elementary submodels of C.
λ, µ, κ stand for infinite cardinals.
1 On the order ⊳ (where we havex R = (x 0 , . . . x n(R)−1 )), interprets T 0 in T , or thatφ is an interpretation of T 0 in T , or that T ⊢ "φ is a model of T 0 ", if each ϕ R (x R ) ∈ L(T ), and for any M |= T , the model M [φ] described below is a model of T 0 . Here, N = M
[φ] is a τ (T ) model, whose set of elements is {a : M |= ϕ = (a, a)} (so M
[φ] ⊆ M) and R N = {ā : M |= ϕ R [ā]} for a predicate R of T 0 , and similarly for function symbols of τ (T 0 ). To be precise, for a function symbol f of τ (T 0 ) we have that N |= "f (ā) = b" iff M |= ϕ f (ā, b), while
for allā, b, c.
(2) We say that the interpretationφ is trivial if ϕ R (x R ) = R(x R ) for all R ∈ τ (T 0 ), so M
[φ] = M ↾ τ (T 0 ), for any model M of T .
(The last clause in Definition 1.1(1) shows that we can in fact restrict ourselves to vocabularies without function or constant symbols.)
We use the notion of interpretations to define a certain relation among theories. A close variant of this relation was considered by S. Shelah in [Sh 500 ], section §2.
Note 1.2
The present definition is implied by the one from [Sh 500] , and in particular, all results we prove apply also to the order from [Sh 500 ]. Definition 1.3 For (complete first order) theories T 0 , T 1 we define:
(1) A triple (T,φ 0 ,φ 1 ) is called a (T 0 , T 1 )-superior iff T is a theory andφ l is an interpretation of T l in T , for l < 2.
(2) For a cardinal κ, a (T 0 , T 1 )-superior (T,φ 0 ,φ 1 ) is called κ-relevant iff |T | < κ.
(3) For regular cardinals λ, µ we say T 0 ⊳ * λ,µ T 1 if there is a min(µ, λ)-relevant (T 0 , T 1 )-superior triple (T,φ 0 ,φ 1 ) such that in every model M of T in which M
[φ 1 ] is µ-saturated, the model M [φ 0 ] is λ-saturated. If this happens, we call the triple a witness for T 0 ⊳ * λ,µ T 1 .
(4) We say that T 0 ⊳ p ⊆ {±ϑ(x,ā) :ā ∈ lg(ȳ) M} for some fixed ϑ(x,ȳ) are considered.
(2) We say T 0 ⊳ *
Observation 1.5 (0) If T 0 ⊳ * λ,µ T 1 and l < 2, then there is a witness (T,φ 0 ,φ 1 ) such thatφ l is trivial, hence T l ⊆ T . (1) ⊳ * λ is a partial order among theories (note that T ⊳ * λ T for every complete T of size < λ, and that the strict inequality is written as
[Why? (0) Trivial.
(1) Suppose that T l ⊳ * λ T l+1 for l < 2 over θ, as exemplified by (T * ,φ 0 ,φ 1 ) and (T * * ,ψ 1 ,ψ 2 ) respectively. Without loss of generality,φ 1 is trivial (apply part (0)), so as T * is complete we have T 1 ⊆ T * . Similarly, without loss of generality,ψ 1 is trivial and so, as T * * is complete, we have T 1 ⊆ T * * . As T 1 is complete, without loss of generality, T * and T * * agree on the common part of their vocabularies, and hence by Robinson Consistency Criterion, T def = T * ∪ T * * is consistent. Also |T * | + |T * * | < θ, hence |T | < θ. Clearly T interprets T 0 , T 1 , T 2 byφ 0 ,φ 1 =ψ 1 andψ 2 respectively and T is complete. We now show that the triple (T,φ 0 ,ψ 2 ) is a (T 0 , T 2 )-superior which witnesses
(2) is proved similarly to (1).]
In this section we consider an example of a theory which is a prototypical example of an NSOP 3 theory which is not simple (see [Sh 457]) . It is the model completion of the theory of infinitely many (independent) parametrised equivalence relations, formally defined below. We shall prove that for λ such that λ = λ <λ and 2 λ = λ + , this theory is strictly ⊳ * λ + -below the theory of a dense linear order with no first or last element. Definition 1.6 (1) T feq is the following theory in {Q, P, E, R, F } (a) Predicates P and Q are unary and disjoint, and
(so R picks for each z ∈ Q (at most one) representative of any E-equivalence class).
(d) F is a (partial) binary function from Q × P to Q, which satisfies
(so for x ∈ Q and z ∈ P , the function F picks the representative of the E-equivalence class of x which is in the relation R with z).
(2) T + feq is T feq with the requirement that F is total. (3) For n < ω, we let T n feq be T + feq enriched by the sentence saying that over any n elements, any (not necessarily complete) quantifier free type consisting of basic (atomic and negations of the atomic) formulae with no direct contradictions, is realised. Note 1.7 Every model of T feq can be extended to a model of T + feq . T + feq has the amalgamation property and the joint embedding property. This theory also has a model completion, which can be constructed directly, and which we denote by T * feq . It follows that T * feq is a complete theory with infinite models, in which F is a full function.
Remark 1.8 Notice that T feq has been defined somewhat simpler than in [Sh 457, §1] , but the difference is non-essential. Up to renaming, the two theories have the same model completion, which is what interests us.
To obtain the theory from [Sh 457] , and the origin of the "infinitely many equivalence relations" in the name of the theory, we just need to look at our theory from another point of view. Namely, each E-equivalence class e = a/E, gives rise to an equivalence relation E * e on P given by:
This definition does not depend on a, just on a/E. Hence we obtain infinitely many independent equivalence relations on P . Conversely, given a model of "infinitely many independent equivalence relations", it is easy to read off a model of T + feq from it. Observation 1.9 T * feq has elimination of quantifiers and for any n, any model of T * feq is a model of T n feq . Notation 1.10 T ord stands for the theory of a dense linear order with no first or last element.
The following convention will make the notation used in this section simpler. Convention 1.11 Whenever considering (T ord , T * feq )-superiors (T,φ,ψ), we shall make an abuse of notation and assumeφ = (I, < 0 ) andψ = (P, Q, E, R).
In such a case we may also write P M in place of P M [ψ] etc., and we may simply say that T is a (T ord , T * feq )-superior.
[φ] such that for all i we have a i < 0 x < 0 b i , (iv) the Dedekind cut {x : i<λ x < 0 a i } is not definable by any formula of L(M) with parameters in M.
Main Claim 1.13 Assume λ <λ = λ and (T,φ,ψ) is a λ-relevant (T ord , T * feq )-superior. Further assume that * [M,ā,b] holds, and p = p(z) is a (consistent) T * feq -type over M [ψ] . Then there is N |= T with M ≺ N, such that p(z) is realised in N [ψ] and * [N,ā,b] holds.
Proof of the Main Claim. Stage A. Without loss of generality, p is complete in the T * feq -language over M [ψ] . (By Convention 1.11, we can consider p to be a type over M (rather than M [ψ] ). We shall use this Convention throughout the proof). If p is realised in M, our conclusion follows by taking N = M, so let us assume that this is not the case. Using the elimination of quantifiers for T Proof of the Subclaim. Suppose that we are in the Case 1A. Let
For i limit or i = 0, the choice is trivial. For the situation when i is a successor, we use Case 2. Stage B. Let us assume that p is a type as in one of the Cases 1,2 or 3, which we can do by Subclaim 1.15. We shall define M α : α < λ , an ≺-increasing continuous sequence of elementary submodels of M, each of size < λ, and with union M, such that:
Hence, for some club C of λ consisting of limit ordinals δ, we have that for all δ ∈ C,
Let C = {δ i : i < λ} be an increasing continuous enumeration. Now we come to the main point of the proof. By induction on i = lg(η) < λ we shall chooseh = h η : η ∈ λ> 2 , a sequence such that (α) h η is an elementary embedding of M δ lg(η) into C T , whose range will be denoted by N η .
(γ) If η l ∈ λ> 2 for l = 0, 1 and η 0 ∩ η 1 = η, then:
(ii) In addition, if a l ∈ Q Nη l for l = 0, 1 and a 0 E C T a 1 , then for some a ∈ Q Nη we have a l E C T a for l = 0, 1. (Equivalently, if a l ∈ Q Nη l and ¬(∃a ∈ N η )(∧ l<2 a l E a), then ¬(a 0 E a 1 )).
(δ) If for some l < 2 and η ∈ λ> 2 we have a ∈ N η⌢ l \ N η and b ∈ N η , then
We now describe the inductive choice of h η for η ∈ λ> 2, the induction being on i = lg(η). Let h = id M 0 . If i is a limit ordinal, we just let h η def = j<lg(η) h η↾j . Hence, the point is to handle the successor case. Fixing i < λ, let η i,α : α < α * ≤ λ list i+1 2, in such a manner that η i,2α ↾ i = η i,2α+1 ↾ i and η i,2α+l (i) = l for l < 2 (we are using the assumption λ <λ = λ). Now we choose h η i,2α+l by induction on α. Hence, coming to α, let us denote by η l the sequence η i,2α+l , and let
We consider the type Γ, which is the union of (a)
, 
, and similarly for hη 1 , will take care of the part (ε) above.)
, where
Γ 4 = {x
are taking care of (γ) above, part (i)).
(f)
.
(together with Γ 6 below, taking care of part (γ)(ii), see below.) (g) Γ 6 = Γ First note that requiring Γ 5 ∪ Γ 6 throughout the construction indeed guarantees that (γ)(ii) is satisfied. Note also that as a part of Γ 0 ∪ Γ 1 we have
which takes care of the requirement (δ). We also note that if j 0 , j 1 < j * i are such that ¬(x
We conclude that, if Γ is consistent, as C isκ-saturated, the functions h η l can be defined. Namely, for a realisation {c We let h η 1 = g 1−l if h η 0 = g l . This guarantees that (ε) above is satisfied.
Let us then show that Γ is consistent. Suppose for contradiction that this is not so, so we can find a finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ which is inconsistent. Let {j 0 , . . . , j n−1 } be an increasing enumeration of a set including all j < j * i
such that x l j is mentioned in Γ ′ for some l < 2 and letd = d
. Without loss of generality, 0 and 1 appear in the list {j 0 , . . . , j n−1 } and j 0 = 0 while j 1 = 1. By closing under conjunctions and increasing Γ ′ (retaining that Γ ′ ⊆ Γ is finite) if necessary, we may assume that for some formula
; h η (c)) is the formula obtained from σ by replacing x k by x l j k andc by h η (c). Let ϑ 2 be the formula comprising Γ 2 and ϑ
The choice of n may be assumed to have been such that for some c
Note that this implies that for all j 0 , j 1 < j * i such that ¬(x
. By extending h η to an automorphismĥ η of C, and applying (ĥ η ) −1 , we may assume that h η = id M δ i . We can also assume that no c l k is an element of M δ i , as otherwise the relevant inequalities can be absorbed by σ.
We shall use the following general
is consistent (and in fact, every finite subset of it is realised in N).
Proof of the Fact. Otherwise, there is a finite r ′ (x) ⊆ r(x) which is inconsistent. Without loss of generality, r ′ (x) is the union of sets of the following form (we have a representative type of the sets for each clause)
• {̺(x,c)} for somec ⊆ N and ̺ such that |= ̺[ē,c].
• {x k =ĉ
By the elementarity of N, there isē c] . By the choice of the rest of the formulas inr ′ (x), we see thatē ′ satisfies them as well, which is a contradiction. ⋆ 1.16
Applying the last phrase in the above Fact to Φ 0 (x 0 ), the model M δ i and d, we obtain a sequenceē
) is a finite set to which we can apply the last phrase of Fact 1.16. In this way we findē
So D is first order definable with parameters in M δ i and we have just shown
e. satisfy ϑ 2 , and hence for no
Arguing as above, withū 0 in place ofē 0 and Φ 1 (x) ∪ {u 
and
Of course, this holds in C as well, so
(c) the segments defined by ̺ 0 (z) and ̺ 1 (z) are disjoint,
The above arguments show that {x : Stage C. Now we have shown that the trees N η : η ∈ λ> 2 , h η : η ∈ λ> 2 of models and embeddings can be defined as required, and we consider
We shall show that p * is finitely satisfiable, hence satisfiable. Let Γ ′ ⊆ p * be finite. Recalling the analysis of p from Stage A, we consider each of the cases by which p could have been defined (ignoring Case 1A, as justified by Subclaim 1.15.) Case 1. In this case there is a function f : Q M → Q M respecting E, with aEf (a) for all a ∈ Q M , and without loss of generality there are some η 0 , . . . η m−1 ∈ λ> 2 and {b
and for each j we have {b
a quantifier free (partial) type over n variables in C [ψ] . By Observation 1.9 , we only need to check that in Γ ′ there are no direct contradictions with the axioms of T + feq . The only possibility for such a contradiction is that for some j 0 , j 1 and b
In such a case, any c which would realise Γ 
so applying the elementarity of the maps, we obtain
On the other hand, by the definition of p * we have b
. By the the demands on p this implies that b
so without loss of generality
for some c 0 , . . . , c m−1 ∈ a * /E M and η 0 , . . . , η m−1 ∈ λ> 2, as h = id M 0 . As a * /E is infinite in any model of T * feq , the set Γ ′ is consistent. Case 3. We may assume that for some equivalence relation E on P M , a function f from P M into {yes, no}, sequences η 0 , . . . η n−1 ∈ λ> 2, and
We could have a contradiction if for some k 1 , k 2 , i 1 , i 2 we had f (b
), which cannot happen by γ(i) and the fact that each h η is 1-1. Another possibility is that for some b
). To see that this cannot happen, we distinguish various possibilities for b
and use part (γ)(ii) in the choice ofh.
Yet another possible source of contradiction could come from a similar consideration involving the last clause in the definition of Γ ′ (z), which cannot happen for similar reasons.
Stage D. Now we can conclude, using λ = λ <λ and |T | < λ, that there is a model N * ≺ C of size λ with η∈ λ> 2 N η ⊆ N * , such that p * is realised in N * .
Hence we have that for ν = ρ from λ 2, the types q ν and q ρ are contradictory, by (ε) above. As ||N * || + |L(T )| ≤ λ, there are only ≤ λ definable Dedekind cuts of < 0 over N * , and only ≤ λ types q ν are realised in N * . Hence there is ν ∈ λ 2 (actually 2 λ many) such that the Dedekind cut {x : ∨ i<λ x < 0 h ν (a i )} is not definable over N * and q ν is not realised in N * . So N * omits q ν and realises p ν . We let N = h(N * ), where h is an automorphism of C extending h −1 ν . ⋆ 1.13 Theorem 1.17 Assume that λ <λ = λ and 2
(2) We can strengthen the claims in (i) and (ii) to include any interpretations of a dense linear order and T * feq -respectively in M * , even with parameters.
Proof. We prove (1), and (2) is proved similarly. Using the Main Claim 1.13, we can construct M * of size λ + , by an ≺-increasing continuous sequence 2 On the properties SOP 2 and SOP 1
In his paper [Sh 500 ], S. Shelah investigated a hierarchy of properties unstable theories without strong order property may have. This hierarchy is named NSOP n for 3 ≤ n < ω, where the acronym NSOP stands for "not strong order property". The negation of NSOP n is denoted by SOP n . It was shown in [Sh 500 ] that SOP n+1 =⇒ SOP n , that the implication is strict and that SOP 3 theories are not simple. In this section we investigate two further notions, which with the intention of furthering the above hierarchy, we name SOP 2 and SOP 1 . In section 3, a connection between this hierarchy and ⊳ * λ -maximality will be established.
Recall from [Sh 500 ] one of the equivalent definitions of SOP 3 . (The equivalence is established in Claim 2.19 of [Sh 500] ).
Definition 2.1 A complete theory T has SOP 3 iff there is an indiscernible sequence ā i : i < ω and formulae ϕ(x,ȳ), ψ(x,ȳ) such that (a) {ϕ(x,ȳ), ψ(x,ȳ)} is contradictory, (b) for some sequence b j : j < ω we have
(c) for i < j, the set {ϕ(x,ā j ), ψ(x,ā i )} is contradictory.
Definition 2.2 (1) T has SOP 2 if there is a formula ϕ(x,ȳ) which exemplifies this property in C = C T , which means:
There areā η ∈ C for η ∈ ω> 2 such that (a) For every η ∈ ω 2, the set {ϕ(x,ā η↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent.
(2) T has SOP 1 if there is a formula ϕ(x,ȳ) which exemplifies this in C, which means:
There areā η ∈ C, for η ∈ ω> 2 such that:
(a) for ρ ∈ ω 2 the set {ϕ(x,ā ρ↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent.
(3) NSOP 2 and NSOP 1 are the negations of SOP 2 and SOP 1 respectively.
The definition of when a theory has SOP 1 can be made in another, equivalent, fashion. Definition 2.3 Let ϕ(x,ȳ) be a formula of L(T ). We say ϕ(x,ȳ) has SOP ′ 1 iff there are ā η : η ∈ ω> 2 in C T such that (a) {ϕ(x,ā η↾n ) η(n) : n < ω} is consistent for every η ∈ ω 2, where we use the notation
We say that T has property SOP ′ 1 iff some formula of L(T ) has it.
Claim 2.4 (1) If ϕ(x,ȳ) exemplifies SOP 1 of T then ϕ(x,ȳ) (hence T ) has property SOP ′ 1 .
(2) If T has property SOP ′ 1 then T has SOP 1 . Proof of the Claim. (1) Let {ā η : η ∈ ω> 2} and ϕ(x,ȳ) exemplify that T has SOP 1 . For η ∈ ω> 2 we defineb η def =ā η⌢ 1 . We shall show that ϕ(x,ȳ) and {b η : η ∈ ω> 2} exemplify SOP ′ 1 . Givenη ∈ ω 2. Letc exemplify that item (a) from Definition 2.2(2) holds forη. Given n < ω, we consider ϕ[c, η, clearly ν ⌢ 0 η ⌢ 1 , and so (b) of Definition 2.2(2) implies that {ϕ(x,ā η⌢ 1 ), ϕ(x,ā ν⌢ 1 )} is contradictory, a contradiction. Hence the set {ϕ(x,b η ), ϕ(x,b ν )} is contradictory (2) Define first for η ∈ ω≥ 2 an element ρ η ∈ ω≥ 2 by letting
and if lg(η) = k < ω, then lg(ρ η ) = 3k. Notice that for η ∈ ω 2 and k < ω we have ρ η↾k = ρ η ↾ (3k).
Let ϕ(x,ȳ) and {ā η : η ∈ ω> 2} exemplify property SOP ′ 1 . We pick c 0 = c 1 and define for η ∈ ω> 2 b η⌢ 1 def =ā ρη ⌢ā ρη ⌢ 1 ⌢ c 0 , c 1 ,
where c k stands for the sequence of k entries, each of which is c, and n = lg(ȳ) in ϕ(x,ȳ). We define
. We now claim that ψ(x,z) and {b η : η ∈ ω> 2} exemplify that SOP 1 holds for T . Before we start checking this, note that for η ∈ ω> 2 we have:
• 1 ψ(x,b ) holds for anyx,
Let us verify 2.2(2)(a), so let η ∈ ω 2. Pickc such that ϕ[c,ā ρη↾n ] ρη (n) holds for all n < ω. We claim that
The proof is by induction on n.
If n = 0, this is trivially true. If n = k + 1 and η(k) = 0, then we need to verify that ϕ[c,ā ρ η↾k ⌢ 0,0 ] holds and ¬ϕ[c,ā ρ η↾k ] holds. We have ρ η↾k ⌢ 0, 0 = ρ η ↾ (3k + 2), and ρ η (3k + 2) = 1. Hence ϕ[c,ā ρ η↾k ⌢ 0,0 ] holds by the choice ofc. On the other hand, we have ρ η↾k = ρ η ↾ (3k), and ρ η (3k) = η(k) = 0, hence ¬ϕ[c,ā ρ η↾k ] holds.
If n = k + 1 and η(k) = 1, then we need to verify that ϕ[c,ā ρ η↾k ] holds while ϕ[c,ā ρη↾(3k)⌢ 1 ] does not. As ρ η↾k = ρ η ↾ (3k), and ρ η (3k) = η(k) = 1, we have that ϕ[c,ā ρη↾k )] holds. Note that ϕ[c,ā ρη↾(3k+2) ] holds as ρ η (3k+2) = 1. We also have (ρ η ↾ (3k + 1)) ⌢ 0
holds, so we are done proving ( * ).
Let us now verify 2.2(2)(b). So suppose ν ⌢ 0 η and consider
Case 2. ν ⊳ σ and l = 0.
We have ψ(x,b ν⌢ 1 ) =⇒ ϕ(x,ā ρν ) by • 3 and ψ(x,b η ) =⇒ ϕ(x,ā ρσ⌢ 0,0 )
• 2 , and the two formulae being implied are contradictory, by (b) in the definition of SOP ′ 1 . Case 3. ν ⊳ σ and l = 1. Observe that ψ(x,b η ) =⇒ ϕ(x,ā ρσ ) by • 3 and ψ(x,b ν⌢ 1 ) =⇒ ϕ(x,ā ρν ). As above, using ν ⌢ 0 σ, we show that the set {ϕ(x,ā ρν ), ϕ(x,ā ρσ )} is inconsistent. ⋆ 2.4
Conclusion 2.5 T has SOP 1 iff T has property SOP ′ 1 from Claim 2.4. Question 2.6 Is the conclusion of 2.5 true when the theory T is replaced by a formula ϕ?
The following Claim establishes the relative position of the properties introduced in Definition 2.2 within the (N)SOP hierarchy.
Claim 2.7 For any complete first order theory T , we have
Proof of the Claim. Suppose that T is SOP 3 , as exemplified by ā i : i < ω , b j : j < ω and formulae ϕ(x,ȳ) and ψ(x,ȳ) (see Definition 2.1), and we shall show that T satisfies SOP 2 . We define
Let us first prove the consistency of
Suppose for contradiction that Γ is not consistent, then for some n < ω, the following set is inconsistent:
Fix such n. We pick ordinals α η , β η < ω for η ∈ n≥ 2 so that
For η ∈ n≥ 2 letā * η def =ā αη ⌢ā βη . We show that C and {ā * η : η ∈ n≥ 2} exemplify that Γ ′ is consistent. So, if η ∈ n≥ 2 then we have k≤n ϑ[b αη +1 ,ā * η↾k ] as for every k ≤ n we have α η↾k < α η + 1, so ϕ[b αη+1 ,ā α η↾k ] holds, but also for all k ≤ n, as η ↾ k η, we have β η↾k > α η + 1, so ψ[b αη +1 ,ā β η↾k ] holds. Hence (∃x)[ k≤n ϑ(x,ā * η↾k )]. On the other hand, if ν ⌢ l η l for l < 2, then {ϑ(x,ā * η 0 ), ϑ(x,ā * η 1 )} is contradictory as the conjunction implies ψ(x,ā βη 0 ) ∧ ϕ(x,ā αη 1 ), which is contradictory by β η 0 < α η 1 and (c) of Definition 2.1. This shows that Γ ′ is consistent, hence we have also shown that Γ is consistent.
Having shown that Γ is consistent, we can find witnesses {ā * η : η ∈ ω> 2} in C realising Γ. Now we just need to show that {ϑ(x,ā * η↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent for every η ∈ ω 2. This follows by the compactness theorem and the definition of Γ. Hence we have shown that SOP 3 =⇒ SOP 2 .
The second part of the claim is obvious (and the witnesses for SOP 2 can be used for SOP 1 as well).
⋆ 2.7
Question 2.8 Are the implications from Claim 2.7 reversible?
Claim 2.9 If T satisfies SOP 1 , then T is not simple. In fact, if ϕ(x,ȳ) exemplifies SOP 1 of T , then the same formula exemplifies that T has the tree property.
Proof of the Claim. Let ϕ(x,ȳ) and {ā η : η ∈ ω> 2} exemplify SOP 1 . Then Γ η def = {ϕ(x,ā η⌢ 0 n ⌢ 1 ) : n < ω} for η ∈ ω> 2 consists of pairwise contradictory formulae. (Here 0 n denotes a sequence consisting of n zeroes.) For ν ∈ n ω let
so ρ ν ∈ ω> 2 and ν η =⇒ ρ ν ρ η . For ν ∈ n ω letb ν =ā ρν . We observe first that {ϕ(x,b νˆ k ) : k < ω} is a set of pairwise contradictory formulae, for ν ∈ n ω; namely, if k 0 = k 1 , then ϕ(x,b ν⌢ k l ) for l < 2 are two different elements of Γ ρν . On the other hand, {ϕ(x,b ν↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent for every ν ∈ ω ω. Hence ϕ(x,ȳ) and {b ν : ν ∈ ω> ω} exemplify that T has the tree property, and so T is not simple. ⋆ 2.9
It turns out that witnesses to being SOP 1 can be chosen to be highly indiscernible. 
(2) We say that the sequence ā η : η ∈ α> 2 of C (for an ordinal α) are 1-fully binary tree indiscernible (1-fbti) iff wheneverη 0 ≈ 1η1 are sequences of elements of α> 2, thenāη
and the similarly definedāη 1 , realise the same type in C.
(3) We replace 1 by 2 in the above definitions iff (η
Claim 2.11 If t ∈ {1, 2} and b η : η ∈ ω> 2 are given, and δ ≥ ω, then we can find ā η : η ∈ δ> 2 such that (a) ā η : η ∈ δ> 2 is t-fbti, (b) ifη = η m : m < n , where each η m ∈ δ> 2 is given, and ∆ is a finite set of formulae of T , then we can find ν m ∈ ω> 2 (m < n) such that with ν def = ν m : m < n , we haveν ≈ tη and the sequencesāη andbν, realise the same ∆-types.
Proof of the Claim. The proof goes through a series of steps through which we obtain increasing degrees of indiscernibility. We shall need some auxiliary definitions.
Definition 2.12 (1) Givenη = η 0 , . . . , η k−1 , a sequence of elements of α> 2, and an ordinal γ. We defineη ′ = cl γ (η) as follows:
(2) We say thatη ≈ γ,nν iffη
(ii) for l < m we have η
, and for such l we have η
, and the same holds for the equality,
(and hence the same holds with 1 in place of 0).
(3) ā η : η ∈ α> 2 is (γ, n)-indiscernible iff for everyη,ν ∈ k ( α> 2) with η ≈ (γ,n)ν , the tuplesāη andāν realise the same type. (4) (≤ γ, n)-indiscernibility is the conjunction of (β, n)-indiscernibility for all β ≤ γ. (5) We say that ā η : η ∈ α> 2 is 0-fbti iff it is (γ, n)-indiscernible for all γ and n. Subclaim 2.13 Ifā η ∈ k C for η ∈ ω> 2, then we can findā
for every n and a finite set ∆ of formulae, we can find h : n≥ 2 → ω> 2 such that (α) ā ′ η : η ∈ n≥ 2 and ā h(η) : η ∈ n≥ 2 realise the same ∆-type, (β) h satisfies h(η)ˆ l h(ηˆ l ) for η ∈ n> 2 and l < 2, and
Proof of the Subclaim. Let ( * ) γ,n be the conjunction of the statement (x) γ,n given byā ′ is (≤ γ, n)-indiscernible, and (xx) above. We prove by induction on n that for any γ ≤ ω we can find a ′ for which ( * ) γ,n holds. n = 0. We useā ′ η =ā η . n + 1. By induction on γ ≤ ω, we prove that there isā ′ for which ( * ) γ,n+1 + ( * ) ω,n + (xx) holds. γ = 0 (or just γ < ω).
Without loss of generality, the sequence ā η : η ∈ ω> 2 is (≤ ω, n)-indiscernible and (< γ, n + 1)-indiscernible, by the transitivity of (xx) as a relation between ā η : η ∈ ω> 2 and ā ′ η : η ∈ ω> 2 . Suppose we are givenη,ν satisfyinḡ η ≈ γ,n+1ν , in particular the appropriately defined u 1 , u 2 have size ≤ n + 1. For simplicity in notation, we assumeη,ν to be the same as their cl γ closures.
If |u 1 | ≤ n, the conclusion follows by the assumptions. Moreover, if min(u 1 ) = min(u 2 ) and lg(η l ) = min(u 1 ) =⇒ η l = ν l , using (x) min(u 1 ),n , we get the equivalence. So, fixing a finite set ∆ of formulae and k < ω, for everyη, defining u 1 appropriately, we get that the tp ∆ (āη) depends just on theη/ ≈ γ,n+1
. By the closure properties ofη, we get that
are the representatives under equality of restrictions to γ + 1. As we have fixed ∆, the set of relevant Υ is finite. Let k * = 2 γ+1 (so finite) and let {ν * k : k < k * } list γ+1 2. We define
Define a function F with arity k * so that F ((. . . , x k , . . . ) k<k * ) is defined iff for some m < ω we have {x k : k < k * } ⊆ m 2 and then
Now we use the Halpern-Lauchli [HaLa] theorem. We get a set of functions h k : ω> 2 → ω> 2 for k < k * such that
• lg(h k (η)) depends just on lg(η) (not on k or on the values taken by η),
• for some c we have
We obtain the desired conclusion, but localized to ∆. The induction step ends by an application of the compactness theorem. γ = ω Follows by the induction hypothesis and the compactness.
The conclusion of the Subclaim follows by the compactness theorem. ⋆ 2.13
Now we go back to the proof of the Claim. Let us first work with t = 1. Given b η : η ∈ ω> 2 as in the assumptions, by the Subclaim we can assume that they are 0-fbti. We choose by induction on n a function h n : n≥ 2 → ω> 2 as follows. Let h 0 ( ) = . If h n is defined, let
and let
where the sequence of 0s in the last part of the definition, has length k n . Now we can check that b hn(η) : η ∈ n≥ 2 are 1-fbti, for each n. Hence, we can finish by compactness.
For t = 2, we use the same proof, except that we let h n+1 ( 1 ˆν) = 0, 1 ˆh n (ν).
Claim 2.14 If t ∈ {1, 2} and ϕ(x,ȳ) exemplifies that T has SOP t , we can without loss of generality assume that the witnesses ā η : η ∈ ω> 2 for this fact are t-fbti.
Proof of the Claim. Letb = b η : η ∈ ω> 2 be any witnesses to the fact that ϕ(x,ȳ) exemplifies that T has SOP t . Letā = ā η : η ∈ ω> 2 be t-fbti and satisfy the properties guaranteed by Claim 2.11. We check thatā satisfies the properties (a) and (b) from the Definition of SOP t .
For (a), we first work with t = 1, the case t = 2 is similar. Let ρ ∈ ω 2 be given, and suppose that {ϕ(x,ā ρ↾n ) : n < ω} is inconsistent. Then there is some n * < ω such that {ϕ(x,ā ρ↾n ) : n < n * } is inconsistent. Let ρ = ρ ↾ n : n < n * , and let
Letν ≈ tρ be such thatbν andāρ realise the same ∆-types. Asν ≈ tρ we have thatν = ν 0 , ν 1 , . . . ν n * −1 for some ν 0 , ν 1 , . . . ν n * −1 satisfying
Let η ∈ ω 2 be such that ν i η for all i. Hence {ϕ(x,b η↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent, so in particular
For (b), suppose that η 0 ⌢ 0 η and letη = η 0 , η, η 0 ⌢ 1 , while ∆ = {ϕ * 2 (ȳ 0 ,ȳ 1 )}. Letν = ν 0 , ν 1 , ν 2 be such thatη ≈ tν andbν realises the same ∆-types asāη. If t = 1, asν ≈ tη we have ν 0 ⌢ 0 ν 2 , hence {ϕ(x,b ν 0 ⌢ 1 ), ϕ(x,b ν )} is contradictory, hence {ϕ(x,ā η 0 ⌢ 1 ), ϕ(x,ā η )} is contradictory. The case t = 2 is similar, as the notion of incompatibility in ω> 2 can be encaptured by a relevant choice ofη. ⋆ 2.14 The next claim shows that in the case of theories which are SOP 1 and NSOP 2 , the witnesses to being SOP 1 can be chosen to be particularly nice.
Claim 2.15 Suppose that ϕ(x,ȳ) satisfies SOP 1 , but for no n does the formula ϕ n (x,ȳ 0 , . . . ,ȳ n−1 ) ≡ ∧ϕ k<n ϕ(x,ȳ k ) satisfy SOP 2 . Then there are witnesses ā η : η ∈ ω> 2 for ϕ(x,ȳ) satisfying SOP 1 which in addition satisfy:
(c) if X ⊆ ω> 2, and there are no η, ν ∈ X such that η ⌢ 0 ν, then {ϕ(x,ā η ) : η ∈ X} is consistent.
(d) ā η : η ∈ ω> 2 is 1-fbti.
(In particular, such a formula and witnesses can be found for any theory satisfying SOP 1 and NSOP 2 .)
Proof of the Claim. Let ϕ(x,ȳ) be a SOP 1 formula which is not SOP 2 , and moreover assume that for no n does the formula ϕ n defined as above satisfy SOP 2 . By Claim 2.14, we can find witnesses ā η : η ∈ ω> 2 which are 1-fbti. By the compactness theorem, we can assume that we have a 1-fbti sequence ā η : η ∈ ω 1 > 2 with the properties corresponding to (a) and (b) of Definition 2.2(2), namely (a) for every η ∈ ω 1 2, the set {ϕ(x,ā η↾α ) :
We shall now attempt to choose ν η and w η for η ∈ ω 1 > 2, by induction on lg(η) = α < ω 1 so that:
if η ∈ β 2 and l < 2, then w η⌢ l ⊆ {ρ ∈ ω 1 > 2 : ν η ⌢ l ρ} and max{lg(ρ) : ρ ∈ w η⌢ l } < lg(ν η⌢ l ),
we have that for all large enough β * , the set
Before proceeding, we make several remarks about this definition. Firstly, requirements (vii) and (viii) taken together imply that for each η ∈ ω 1 > 2 we have that w η⌢ 0 ∪w η⌢ 1 = ∅. Secondly, the definition of w η⌢ l for l ∈ {0, 1} implies that
Thirdly, in (vii), any ρ * which satisfies that ν η ⊳ρ * and |{γ : ρ * (γ) = 1}| = ℵ 1 can be chosen as ρ * η , by indiscernibility. Now let us assume that a choice as above is possible, and we have made it. Hence for each η ∈ ω 1 > 2 there is a finite q η ⊆ p η such that
is inconsistent. Notice that there are q and η * ∈ ω 1 2 such that
Namely, otherwise, we would have the following: each p η is countable, hence for every η there is g(η) with η g(η) ∈ ω 1 > 2 and
Let η 0 def = , and for n < ω let η n+1 = g(η n ). Let η def = ∪ n<ω η n , hence p η = ∪ n<ω p ηn (as w η = ∅), and so q η ⊆ p ηn for some n, a contradiction.
Having found such q, η * , by renaming we can assume that η * def = and that for all η we have q η = p = q (as η ν =⇒ p η ⊆ p ν ). For η ∈ ω 1 > 2 letτ η list w η . Without loss of generality, by thinning and renaming, we have that for all η 1 , η 2 ,
(We are using the following colouring theorem: if cf(κ) = κ and we colour κ> 2 by θ < κ colours, then there is an embedding h : ω> 2 → κ> 2 such that h(η)ˆ l h(η)ˆ l and Rang(h) is monochromatic.) Similarly to the proof of Claim 2.4, we can define a formula ψ(x,ȳ) and {b η : η ∈ ω> 2} such that
We claim that ψ(x,ȳ) and b η : η ∈ ω> 2 exemplify SOP 2 of T , which is then a contradiction (noting that ψ is a formula of the form ϕ n for some n, where ϕ n was defined in the statement of the Claim). We check the two properties from Definition 2.2(1).
To see (a), let η ∈ ω 2 be given. We have that p η is consistent, and q ⊆ p η . For n < ω, we have
As this is a conjunction of a set of formulae each of which is from p η , we have that {ψ(x,b η↾n ) : n < ω} is consistent. To check (b), suppose η ⊥ ν ∈ ω> 2. Let n be such that η ↾ n = ν ↾ n but η(n) = ν(n). Hence
so taken together, the two are contradictory by the choice of q. We conclude that the choice of ν η and w η cannot be carried throughout η ∈ ω 1 > 2. So, there is α < ω 1 and η ∈ α 2 such that ν η , w η⌢ l , ν η⌢ l for l < 2 cannot be chosen, and α is the first ordinal for which there is such η. Let ν
above. We conclude that w η⌢ l for l < 2 using any ρ ↾ ν 0 η for ν η could not have been chosen, and examine why this is so. Note that p η is already defined. Let
w ⊆ {Υ ∈ ω 1 > 2 : ρ ↾ γ Υ} is finite and for some β ρ < β the set
We make several observations: (0) If (ρ, γ, w) ∈ Θ and w ⊆ w ′ with w ′ finite and
[This is obvious.] (1) If (ρ l , γ l , w l ) ∈ Θ and for some σ ∈ ω 1 > 2 with ν 0 η σ we have σ ⌢ l ⊳ρ l ↾ γ for l < 2, while ρ 0 and ρ 1 are eventually equal, then (ρ l , lg(σ), w 1 ∪ w 2 ) ∈ Θ.
[Why? We have w l ⊆ {Υ ∈ ω 1 > 2 : ρ l ↾ γ Υ} is finite, so clearly w 0 ∪ w 1 ⊆ {Υ ∈ ω 1 > 2 : σ Υ} is finite. By the assumption, we have that for some β l < ω 1 for l < 2 (1) is not true and let β * ≥ max{β 0 , β 1 } be such that β * < ω 1 and for β > β * the equality ρ 0 (β) = ρ 1 (β) holds. Hence we have that
is inconsistent. By increasing w 0 if necessary, (0) implies that
for a large enough β * l so that β * < β * l and max({lg(Υ) : Υ ∈ w η⌢ l }) < β * l .
This choice shows that we could have chosen ν η , w η⌢ l and ν η⌢ l as required, contradicting the choice of η.] (2) If ν 0 η ⊳ ρ ∈ ω 1 2 for some ρ such that there are ℵ 1 many β < ω 1 with ρ(β) = 1, and lg(ν
[Why? By the choice of p η and the remark about the freedom in the choice of ρ * that we made earlier.] Now we use the choice of η to define witnesses to T being SOP 1 which also satisfy the requirements of the Claim. For τ ∈ ω> 2, letb τ def =ā ν 0 η ⌢τ . Let us check the required properties. Properties (a),(b) and (d) follow from the choice of {ā σ : σ ∈ ω> 2}. Let X * ⊆ ω> 2 be such that there are no σ, ν ∈ X * with σ ⌢ 0 ν, we need to show that {ϕ(x,b τ ) : τ ∈ X * } is consistent. It suffices to show the same holds when X * replaced by an arbitrary finite X ⊆ X * . Fix such an X. Clearly, it suffices to show that for some ρ, γ, letting w = {ν 0 η ⌢ τ : τ ∈ X}, we have (ρ, γ, w) ∈ Θ. Let ρ * ∈ ω 1 2 be such that ν 0 η ⊳ ρ * and ρ * (β) = 1 for ℵ 1 many β. By induction on n def = |X| we show: there is ρ ∈ ω 1 2 such that for some γ ≥ max{lg(σ) : σ ∈ w}, we have (ρ, γ, w) ∈ Θ and β > γ =⇒ ρ(β) = ρ * (β), while ρ(γ) = 1. n = 0. Follows by Observation (2) above. n = 1. Let X = {τ } and γ = lg(τ ) + lg(ν 0 τ ). Let ρ ∈ ω 1 2 be such that ρ ↾ γ = ν 0 η ⌢ τ , ρ(γ) = 1 and β > γ =⇒ ρ(β) = ρ * (β). By Observation (2) above, we have that (ρ, γ, ∅) ∈ w. Then, by Observation (0), we have (ρ, γ, w) ∈ Θ. n = k + 1 ≥ 2. Case 1. w is linearly ordered by ⊳. Let τ ∈ w be of maximal length, so clearly σ ∈ w \{τ } =⇒ σ ⌢ 1 τ . Let ρ ∈ ω 1 2 be such that τ ⌢ 1 ⊳ ρ and β > lg(τ ), while ρ(β) = ρ * (β). Now continue as in the case n = 1.
Case 2. Not Case 1. Let σ ∈ ω 1 > 2 be ⊳-maximal such that (∀τ )(τ ∈ w =⇒ σ τ ). This is well defined, as w = ∅. Let w l def = {τ ∈ w : σ ⌢ l τ }, so w 0 ∩ w 1 = ∅ but neither of w 0 , w 1 is empty. Now we have that σ / ∈ w, as otherwise we could choose τ ∈ w 0 such that σ ⌢ 0 τ , obtaining an easy contradiction to our assumptions on X. Hence w = w 0 ∪ w 1 . We can now use Observation (1) and the inductive hypothesis. ⋆ 2.15 3 ⊳ * -maximality revisited
In this section we introduce ⊳ * * λ , which is a version of ⊳ * λ -order considered in the first section, and give a connection between the ⊳ * * λ -maximal complete first order theories T when λ = cf(λ) > |T | and a property similar to SOP 2 . The proof generalises the one in §1.
Definition 3.1 (1) For complete first order theories T 1 , T 2 and a regular
There is a λ-relevant (T 1 , T 2 )-superior (T * ,φ,ψ) (see Definition 1.3) such that T * has Skolem functions and if T * * ⊇ T * is complete with |T * * | < λ then (⊕) there is a model M of T * of size λ and an M [φ] -type p omitted by M such that for every elementary extension N of M of size λ which omits p, and a 1-type q over N [ψ] such that every elementary extension of N of size λ which realises q, realises p.
(2) Let T 1 ⊳ * * T 2 mean that T 1 ⊳ * * λ T 2 holds for all large enough regular λ.
Claim 3.2 For a given a regular cardinal λ > |T 1 |, |T 2 |, if T 1 ⊳ * λ + T 2 , and 2 λ = λ + , then T 1 ⊳ * * λ T 2 . Proof. This statement is just a reformulation of the beginning of the proof of Theorem 1.17. Namely, let (T * ,φ,ψ) be a λ-relevant (T 1 , T 2 )-superior exemplifying that T 1 ⊳ * λ + T 2 . Without loss of generality T * has Skolem functions. Suppose ¬(T 1 ⊳ * * λ T 2 ), and let T * * exemplify this for (T * ,φ,ψ). By extending if necessary, we can assume that T * = T * * . Let M |= T * be of size λ, and let p be an M [φ] type omitted by M. Then for every elementary extension N of M of size λ which omits p, and every 1-type q over N [ψ] , there is an elementary extension N * of N of size λ, which omits p and realises q. By induction, we can build an elementary extension N of M with |N| = λ + , with N omitting p and beingψ-saturated for 1-types with parameters in N (we are using 2 λ = λ + ). This is a contradiction with the choice of T * . ⋆ 3.2 Definition 3.3 We say that T is ⊳ * * λ -maximal iff there is no T + such that T ⊳ * * λ T + .
Main Theorem 3.4 For a theory T , the following implications hold:
where (a) λ λ > |T | is regular and T is ⊳ * * λ -maximal.
(b) For every regular λ > |T |, the theory T is ⊳ * * λ -maximal.
(c) λ λ > |T | is regular and there is a formula σ(x,ȳ), and a sequence
and α 0 < α 1 < . . . α n * −1 < λ is consistent (β) for every large enough m, if g :
and ρ ∈ n≥ m =⇒ lg(g(ρ)) is a successor,
is inconsistent. Here n * = lg(ȳ) in σ(x,ȳ). Proof. The statement (b) =⇒ (a) λ for any fixed regular λ is obvious, as is (d) =⇒ (c) λ . By the compactness theorem, the truth of (c) λ does not depend on λ, hence (c) λ =⇒ (d).
Main Claim 3.5 Let λ = cf(λ) > |T | and let T be a given theory. Then (a) λ =⇒ (c) λ .
Proof of the Main Claim. We are assuming (a) λ , so
Stage A. Let T n tree def = Th( n≥ 2, < tr ) for n < ω, where <=< tr stands for the relation of "being an initial segment of", and let T tree def = lim T n tree : n < ω , that is to say, the set of all ψ which are in T n tree for all large enough n. In order to use (a) λ at a later point, let us fix a theory T * which is a λ-relevant (T tree , T )-superior with Skolem functions (such a T * is easily seen to exist), and letφ,ψ be the interpretations of T tree and T in T * , respectively. We can without loss of generality, by renaming if necessary, assume that L(T ) ⊆ L(T * ), so the interpretationψ is trivial. As |T |, |T * | < λ, we can find A ⊆ λ which codes T and T * . Working in L[A], we shall define a model M of T * of size λ as follows. Let
By a compactness argument and the fact thatφ interprets T tree in T * , we see that Γ is consistent. Let M be a model of Γ of size λ = λ <λ (as we are in
It is easy to check that each p η is a (consistent) type, and that for η 0 = η 1 ∈ λ λ, types p η 0 and p η 1 are contradictory. Let
By the axioms of T tree , we have that p η and p ′ η are equivalent. Now we observe that for some η * ∈ λ λ, the type p ′ η * is omitted in M, and p ′ η * is not definable in M, i.e. for no formula ϑ(y,z) andc ⊆ M do we have: for a ∈ M, the following are equivalent:
= a η * ↾α . We now go back to V and make an observation about M. Subclaim 3.6 T tree satisfies the following property:
for any formula ϑ(x,ȳ) we have that T tree ⊢ σ = σ(ϑ), where
Proof of the Subclaim. Let ϑ(x,ȳ) be given. By the definition of T tree we only need to show that T n tree ⊢ σ for all large enough n, which is obvious as for every n the tree n≥ 2 has the top level. ⋆ 3.6
Hence the interpretationφ of T tree in T * satisfies the same statement claimed about T tree . We conclude:
⊗ if M ≺ N and p is not realised in N, then there is no ϑ(x,c) with c ⊆ N such that ϑ(a η * ↾α ,c) for all α < λ holds, while every two elements of N satisfying θ(x,c) are < ϕ -comparable.
Stage B. We shall choose a filtrationM = M i : i < λ of M, and an increasing sequence α i : i < λ , requiring:
We may note that the branch induced by {a α i : i < λ} is the same as the one induced by {a α : α < λ}. Hence p is realised in any model in which p ′ (x) def = {a α i < ϕ x : i < λ} is realised (or even the similarly defined type using any unbounded subset of {α i : i < λ}). Hence, by renaming, without loss of generality we have α i = i for all i < λ.
Stage C. At this point we shall use (a) λ , which implies that it is not true that T ⊳ * * λ T tree . In particular, our M and p do not exemplify this, hence there is N with M ≺ N and ||N|| = λ, such that N omits p, but for some M
[ψ] 1-type q over N, whenever N ≺ N + and N + realises q, also N + realises p. By ⊗, the branch induced by {a η * ↾ α : α < λ} is not definable in N, so without loss of generality N = M. We can also assume that q is a complete type over M [φ] . Let us now use the choice of q to define for each club E of λ a family of formulae associated with it, and to show that each of these families is inconsistent. We use the abbreviation c.d. for "the complete diagram of".
For any club E of λ we define
Clearly, for any club E, if Γ E is consistent then there is a model N in which Γ E is realised. Identifying any b ∈ M with its interpretation in N and letting a * be the interpretation of x from Γ E , we can assume that N is an elementary extension of M in which q is realised by a * . As T * has Skolem functions, we have M ≺ N. Let N 1 be the submodel of N with universe
Clearly, N 1 is closed under the functions of T * , so M ⊆ N 1 ⊆ N. As T * has Skolem functions, we get that M ≺ N 1 ≺ N. By the third part of the definition of Γ E , p is omitted. This is in contradiction with our assumptions, as a * ∈ N 1 realises q(x). Hence we can conclude for every club E of λ, the set Γ E is inconsistent.
Stage D. Now we start our search for a formula which exemplifies that T has the syntactical property from (c) λ . In the following definitions, we shall use the expression "an almost branch" or the abbreviation a.b. to stand for a set linearly ordered by < ϕ (but not necessarily closed under < ϕ -initial segments and not necessarily unbounded). Let
and let Θ T * be the set of all ϑ(x;ȳ,z) of the form j<n ϑ j (x, y j ,z j ) for some ϑ 0 , . . . ϑ n−1 ∈ Θ 0 T * (whereȳ = y j : j < n andz = ⌢ j<nz j ). The formulae in Θ T * will be called candidates. For every candidate
and aψ-formula σ(x,t), we consider the following game n,σ,ϑ (whose definition also depends on our fixed p, q andM ), played by two players ∃ and ∀. The game starts by ∃ playingb 0 from
, after which ∀ chooses α 1 < λ etc., finishing by ∃ choosingb n−1 ∈ lg(z n−1 ) M and ∀ choosing α n−1 , while ∃ chooses β n−1 ∈ (α n−1 , λ) such thatb n−1 ∈ lg(z n−1 ) M β n−1 . Player ∃ wins this game iff for someē ∈ lg(t) M we have
(Note: the constants a β k are from the set {a i : i < λ} we chose above.) Observe that every sequence α 0 , . . . α n−1 ∈ n λ is an admissible sequence of moves for ∀.
We shall show that for some n ≥ 1 and σ, ϑ, player ∃ has a winning strategy in the game n,σ,ϑ , where ϑ = j<n ϑ j as above. As these are determined games, it suffices to show that for some n ≥ 1 and σ, ϑ, player ∀ does not have a winning strategy. Suppose that this is not the case, arguing in (H(χ), ∈, < * χ ,M , p, q), where χ is large enough and < * χ is a fixed well ordering of H(χ). Fix for a moment (n, σ, ϑ). Player ∀ has a winning strategy in n,σ,ϑ , which, replacing the ordinals α l by constants a α l , can be represented by a sequence of functions G l n,σ,ϑ for l < n (in (H(χ), ∈, < * χ ,M, p, q)), where for l < n, if the play up to time l has beenb 0 , α 0 , β 0 , . . . , α l−1 , β l−1 ,b l , then G l n,σ,ϑ applied to this play is a α l for the α l in the choice of player ∀. We shall assume that these functions are the < * -first which can act in this manner. Using this and elementarity, we notice that for every n, σ, ϑ the values of G l n,σ,ϑ take place in M, and that E 0 def = {δ < λ : (∀σ, ϑ)(∀n)(∀l < n)[M ∩ Skolem (H(χ),∈,M ,G l n,σ,ϑ ) (M δ ) = M δ ]} is a club of λ (as |T * |, ||M i || < λ for all i andM is increasing continuous).
Let E def = acc(E 0 ). Consider now the set Γ E . It is contradictory, so there is a finite subset of it which is contradictory. Hence for some n 0 , n 1 , n 2 < ω and formulae ̺ l (d l ) (l < n 0 ) from the c.d.(M), formulae σ k (x,ē k ) (k < n 1 ) ∈ q(x), ordinals δ 0 < . . . < δ n 2 −1 ∈ E, a sequence b j,l : j < n 2 , l < l j withb j,l ⊆ M δ j and terms τ j,l : j < n 2 , l < l j of T * , the following is inconsistent:
As ̺ l come from the c.d.(M) and q(x) is a complete type over M [ψ] , we may assume that n 0 = 1 and n 1 = 1. Note that we must have n 2 ≥ 1 and that there is no loss of generality in assuming thatb j,l =b j for all l < l j for j < n. We shall omit the subscript 0 from ̺,d, σ,ē. Let n = n 2 and let us define ϑ j (x, y j ,z j ) for j < n by ϑ j (x, y j ,z j ) ≡ l<l j y j < ϕ τ j,l (x,z j ), and let ϑ = j<n ϑ j . Note that for each j we have that ϑ j ∈ Θ 0 T * , as < ϕ is a tree order. Hence ϑ is a candidate, σ(x,ē) ∈ q(x), and since M |= ̺ 
Now we consider the following play of n,σ,ϑ . Let ∃ chooseb 0 . Recall that b 0 ⊆ M δ 0 . The strategy G 0 n,σ,ϑ of ∀ yields an ordinal α 0 . By the choice of E 0 we have α 0 < δ 0 andb 0 ∈ M δ 0 , so we can let ∃ choose β 0 = δ 0 . Let ∃ chooseb 1 and then let ∀ choose α 1 according to the strategy, etc. At the end of the play, player ∀ should have won (as he/she used the supposed winning strategy), but clearly ( * ) implies that ∃ won, a contradiction.
Stage E. We conclude that (for our λ,M, p, q), for some σ, ϑ and n ≥ 1 the player ∃ has a winning strategy in the game n,σ,ϑ , call it St. Let us fix n = n * , σ, ϑ, and St and use them to get the syntactical property from item (c) λ .
For anyᾱ = α 0 , . . . , α n−1 ∈ n λ, we can let bᾱ ↾k , βᾱ ↾(k+1) : k < n be the sequence of moves that ∃ plays by following the winning strategy St in a play in which ∀ playsᾱ, as the dependence is as marked. Let E be a club of λ such that if k ≤ n and α 0 < . . . < α k−1 < δ ∈ E, thenb α 0 ,... ,α k−1 ∈ lg(z j ) M δ . (Such a club can be found by a method similar to the one used in Stage D). Renaming the M i and a i 's, we can without loss of generality assume that E = λ. Forᾱ ∈ n λ letēᾱ be such that:
M |= ∀x[σ(x,ēᾱ) =⇒ j<n ϑ j (x, a βᾱ ↾(j+1) ,bᾱ
Notice that σ is a formula in the language of T . We shall show that σ, together with a conveniently chosen sequence ofēη's, exemplifies the property from (c) λ . The proof now proceeds similarly to the proof of Main Claim 1.13. Namely are analogous to the ones we made in that proof. Fact 1.16 still holds, except that we drop the last set from the definition of r(x). The rest of the proof is the same, recalling that the branch induced by {a i : i < λ} is undefinable in M. ⋆ 3.7
Stage F. For η ∈ λ λ, let h η def = ∪ α<λ h η↾α . Let q η def = h η (q), hence each q η is a consistent type. Forη = η 0 , . . . , η n−1 and η 0 ⊳. . .⊳η n−1 with lg(η i ) = α i +1, letēη def = h η n−1 (ē α 0 ,...α n−1 ). Suppose now that η ∈ λ λ is given, and consider the set {σ(x,ēη) :η = η ↾ (α 0 + 1), . . . η ↾ (α n−1 + 1) for some α 0 < . . . α n−1 < λ}.
This set is a subset of q η , and is hence consistent. This proves property (α) from (c) λ . For (β), let m be large enough and g : n≥ m → λ> λ be as in the statement of (β). For ρ ∈ n m letē gρ def =ē g(ρ↾1),...g(ρ) (note that this is always defined). We shall now show that the set {σ(x,ē gρ ) : ρ ∈ n m} is inconsistent. Suppose otherwise, so let d ∈ C T * realise it. For each ρ ∈ n m, let η ρ ∈ λ λ ⊇ g(ρ) and letᾱ for our ϑ 0 , . . . ϑ n−1 . For each ρ ∈ n m let j(ρ) < n be the first such that ϑ j (d, h ηρ (a βᾱ ρ↾(j+1) , h ηρ (bᾱ ρ↾(j+1) )))
